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the rigidity of the system and increases the long-run stability of the cooperative institution.2 DOMESTIC POLITICS A country's negotiator at the international bargaining table is a political representative, responding (optimally) to and constrained by the political pressures it faces back home (Putnam 1988 ). Domestic political pressures and alignments, however, are subject to changes that are imperfectly anticipated or even unexpected. In periods in which the political pressure to provide some sort of protection to the domestic importcompeting industry becomes unexpectedly acute, a government may be willing (in the absence of any means of escape) to abrogate its responsibilities under a trade agreement entirely to protect its domestic constituency (and its own incumbency). If, however, there are opportunities for signatories to escape their obligations (at least temporarily until the unexpected political pressure passes to a more "normal" state of affairs), an affected country may take such an opportunity while remaining within the parameters of the international agreement. One such avenue of escape is a willingness to be subject to the discipline of the DSP under the WTO. That is, a violation incurred for political reasons may be tolerated by other signatories under the agreement if the violation is temporary, and some sort of compensation scheme is available for the affected country(ies). The use of the DSP therefore allows a contracting partner to violate the agreement, compensate the losers, and still remain within the community of cooperating nations. Hence, an agreement with a DSP is less prone to abrogation by a state suffering intense political pressure to protect; such an agreement is more stable than one without a DSP.3 2 A number of important works have argued the effectiveness of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system and its DSP. Bown (2001) claims that the DSP (or, more specifically, tolerated threats of retaliation) has been successful in generating liberalization. Staiger and Tabellini (1999) suggest that the GATT/WTO provides a (time-consistent) commitment device for governments in the game with their domestic political supporters. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that the principles of nondiscrimination and "most-favored nation," the cornerstones of the GATT/WTO system, lead to countries credibly forgoing beggar-thy-neighbor terms of trade shifts. This article like that of Ethier (2001) Although this paper studies the WTO's DSP in some detail, the underlying intuition regarding the utility of such procedures readily applies to other, regional agreements that embody dispute settlement procedures. See, for example, Gruber (1999) on supranational A self-interested international negotiator pondering the gains and losses of entering into an international agreement may be more willing to sign such an agreement (and be constrained by its provisions) if s/he is aware that breach of its obligations is permitted under certain circumstances. The possibility that future political pressures to protect might become intense implies that an astute politician will want to preserve a policy instrument to deal with that pressure. Commitment to a trading regime where some sort of instrument remains in the hands of the politician is easier to achieve than without it. The "shadow of the future" stretches less far and is less penal when temporary accommodation to political pressure is available (Fearon, 1998; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Sykes 1991) . Whereas only the most patient politicians who value the future very highly can sustain cooperation in an environment without a DSP, an appropriately designed DSP can facilitate entry into the agreement by states less "patient," or with a lower valuation of the future.
Enforcement and the Proportionality Principle
The self-enforcing nature of the agreement makes the DSP effective without explicit enforcement powers. An astute politician may prefer to protect a politically powerful industry in periods of unexpected stress and, at the same time, compensate its trading partners for any burden. Although the compensation demanded may be severe, the domestic political costs of paying the compensation are likely to be smaller than the political benefits from protecting the industry. But what is more crucial is that, by paying the compensation voluntarily, the country is signaling to its trading partners that it intends to return to a cooperative stance as soon as the temporary pressure rescinds. The payment of compensation acts as a signal of the country's intent to continue to cooperate in the future, an intent justified by the continued benefits of cooperation. The payment is a penalty paid to preserve a country's reputation as a cooperator (at least in "normal" times). In response, the trading partners observe this willingness to pay to preserve its reputation and opt not to punish the offending partner by revoking concessions or even exiting the system.4 governance in the North American Free Trade Agreement, or Busch (1999) on forum shopping across agreements, or Levy and Srinivasan (1996) on the effect of allowing private parties access to a regional agreement's DSP on the government's willingness to sign such an agreement. 4 Reinhardt (2001) offers an explanation for the willingness of defendants to settle (offer a concession) prior to the determination of the DSP panel, absent enforcement. In a model where the defendant might be "compliant" and the plaintiff may be "tough," it may be cheaper for a compliant defendant to concede than to risk retaliation after a panel finding. Hence, the threat of retaliation makes the WTO process self-enforcing. Downs et al. (1996) argue that enforcement is not necessary-the WTO, members of which have self-selected themselves into the agreement, is fundamentally cooperative. Alternatively, enforcement is not necessary because the structure and rulings at the WTO reflect the underlying power relations of the The "proportionality principle" (that compensation is limited to that which restores "balance" to previously negotiated concessions) is a crucial element of the DSP. If the cost associated with using the DSP was excessively large (the retaliatory punishment exceeds the political gains), countries would not be willing to apply these penalties to themselves and the DSP would lose its teeth. The proportionality principle limits the costs associated with adopting the DSP and thereby increases the stability of the system.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DSP
The procedures specified in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) adopted during the Uruguay Round are consistent with the practice that had developed since the GATT was first implemented in 1947. A contracting party may file a complaint with the WTO regarding a perceived violation of the treaty on the part of another member. If formal, bilateral consultations are unproductive (an attempt at a negotiated resolution), the complainant may request that a panel of independent experts investigate the matter and make a recommendation (a more "judicial" approach). If the panel finds that the offending action is GATTinconsistent, the offending party is obliged, should the panel so recommend, to terminate the violating measure and bring its practice back into conformity with its GATT obligations. The finding is "legally binding" on the members (Jackson 1997b) and can be appealed to the Standing Appellate Body, a panel of three experts drawn from a permanent roster of seven, selected for a four-year term on a staggered basis. There is no possibility that any member can "block" the report. If the recommendations of the panel are not implemented within a reasonable amount of time, the DSU permits possible "compensation" or retaliation. The purpose is to provide compensatory benefits to restore the balance of negotiated concessions disturbed by the noncomplying measure (Dunoff and Trachtman 1999; Jackson 1997b) . If the offending state does not change its offending action or provide compensation, the WTO may authorize a retaliation to restore balance. Although the agreement clearly favors compliance with negotiated concessions, it is clear that the WTO system "authorizes a Member to choose to 'breach' an obligation, and pay compensation to the injured party" (Dunoff and Trachtman 1999, 26).5 disputants and, when retaliation is possible, compliance is observed (Garrett and Smith 2002). 5 Jackson (1997a, 1998) argues that there is an obligation to "perform" under the terms of the agreement-an offending nation does not have a "choice" to compensate. Yet the DSU specifically authorizes retaliation if an offending country has not complied with a ruling. This view is consistent with the legal hypothesis of "Efficient Breach"-where breach is more efficient in a Pareto sense than is performance under a contract. In this view, the WTO can be viewed as an incomplete contract, and, while there is no true court-like mechanism to compel payment in the case of breach, here we show that voluntary compliance can work just as well. See Dunoff and Trachtman (1999) .
In most cases, the defendants are found in violation.6 In most of those, the defendants abide by the findings of the DSP. This is taken by a number of observers as evidence of the "success" of the institution. Punishments for breach of obligations under the treaty are usually set at a level "commensurate with the violations" (Ethier 2001 ) and only the country harmed is compensated (Jackson 1998) .
The effect of a finding by a panel that there has been a violation is an obligation by the offending state to restore the losses experienced by the partner state. The DSP therefore takes four crucial actions: (1) it hears evidence of violation; (2) it rules whether or not a violation has occurred; (3) if a violation is identified, it estimates the compensation that is due; and (4) it reports that compensation has been made (by virtue of closing of the case).
The institution then serves a crucial informationproviding role. It establishes the facts, adjudicates on a violation, estimates the damages, and reports a successful completion of the process. It is this informational role of the DSP that determines its effectiveness in the world trading system.7
THE INSTITUTION AS EQUILIBRIUM
The DSP is a mechanism embodied within the broader set of institutions that govern trading relations between states. Following North (1990) , an institution is viewed as an equilibrium to a game of strategic interaction. In what follows we specify a pair of strategies for two countries that embody a procedure for dealing with violations of a commitment to cooperate that is consistent with the dispute settlement procedures as articulated in the DSU. If this pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium to the game of repeated strategic action that describes relations between trading states, then we can say that the DSP is an equilibrium institution. In the next section we compare two games of international trade policy played between two contracting parties. In the first game there is no DSP institution; in the second, at each period, the players listen to the information provided by the DSP. The institution with the DSP is shown to be more stable than without a DSP; 6 Between 1973 and 1998, over 100 cases were paneled in which a defendant country has either raised its tariffs or refused to liberalize as agreed to. The defendant was found guilty in all but 9 of the cases (Bown 2001). 7 Consistent with Keohane (1984) , this explanation of the effectiveness of the DSP lies in its informational role, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing transparency. For the informational role of multilateral institutions see Oye (1986) . This role for the DSP has also been suggested by Kovenock and Thursby (1994) moreover, a wider variety of states will be willing to sign agreements when a DSP is available than when no such possibility exists.
THE ECONOMY
Consider two countries that are identical, except for their endowments. Each country is endowed with and consumes three goods labeled x, m, and z, where z is the numeraire good (with units chosen that the price of a unit of z is 1). On the supply side, the home country is relatively well endowed with good x, and the foreign country with m. More specifically, the world endowment of x and m are both set at unity; home is endowed with fraction 3 > of good x and 1 -/3 of y; foreign is endowed with 1 -/3 of x and /f of y. The HeckscherOhlin theorem implies that home will import m and export x.
On the demand side, utility is assumed to be additively separable. U(x, m) = u(x) + u(m) + z. Each country has a single instrument at its disposal: a tariff on its imported good. Home can apply the specific tariff t on the imports of good m while foreign levies T on its imports of x. Utility maximization and market clearing implies that the price of m at home rises, and hence the home consumer surplus falls with t, whereas an increase in the tariff abroad actually lowers the price of x at home, raising consumer surplus. The domestic firms earn profits Fnm(t) (for the importcompeting firms) and Hx(r) for the export firms, with nm(t) rising with t and nx(r) falling with r. Tariff revenues are denoted T(t) which rise and then fall with t. The foreign country's payoffs are symmetric. A government's (one-period) utility depends on the sum of consumer and producer surpluses, and tariff revenues.8 Moreover, political pressure, which import-competing firms bring to bear, is added to the objective function by weighting the firms' profit term. Let a > 0 denote the weight that government attaches to firm's profits.
The home government's (one-period) utility function then is G(t, r; a) = CS(t, r) + aHm(t) + Hx(r) + T(t).
Similarly for the foreign government, G*(t, r;a)= CS*(t, r) + an*F(r) + n(t) + T*(T), where a is the weight put on the interests of the import-competing sector in foreign by the foreign government.9
The stochastic political pressure parameters a and a are independently and identically distributed over the support (0, oo), with cumulative distribution function t. At the beginning of each period, the government in each country knows the level of political pressure it faces at home; it is uninformed about the political pressures that have emerged in the foreign country.
8 For any given level of the foreign tariff t, the home government's objective function rises and then falls with the home tariff t; for any given t, G falls with r since the marginal losses to the export firms always outweigh the benefits to the consumer of a higher foreign tariff. 9 These "politically optimal objective functions" capture the idea that government officials are politically motivated (Baldwin 1987) and are consistent with the derived political support functions from a political contributions model such as those by Grossman and Helpman (1994) .
And each is equally uninformed about the nature of the politics each might face in any future period.10
International Cooperation
We characterize the fundamental problem of sustaining cooperation between countries in the realm of international trade.11 Because we are interested in the role of the DSP within an ongoing agreement in which the tariff bindings have been previously set, we take the existence of a previously negotiated pair of cooperative tariffs (tc, rc) as given. Presumably they are the (Pareto optimal) pair of tariffs that maximize the present discounted value of the sum of both governments' expected utility over the infinite future. Moreover, since these were negotiated before the following games are played, these cooperative tariffs were set before the players are aware of the political conditions in the current period in their own countries.12 At the beginning of each period, the players' types a and a are revealed to each country-i.e., home sees a but not a and foreign vice versa. Each country decides on its current period tariff rate simultaneously-whether to renege on the cooperative agreement (and apply the optimal defection tariff) or implement the cooperative tariff. This extensive form description yields payoffs that can be written in the normal form of a standard prisoner's dilemma (PD).
Under Cooperation. The utility of the home government under cooperation is G(tC, tC; a) = CS(tC, rC) + aHm(tc) + Fnx(r) + T(tc) --C(a), which
is not a function of a. Similarly, C*(a) = G*(tc, rC; a). Since the cooperative agreement is negotiated before any details of the domestic politics in either country are revealed, the payoffs for each country are functions only of each country's domestic politics parameter.
Under Nash Equilibrium. Under the Nash equilibrium (NE) to the one-shot game, each player chooses a level of domestic trade barriers as a best response to the behavior of the opponent. In any period in which a and a are known, we can solve for the NE in trade barriers for that period. Let t(r) = arg maxt G(t, r; a), and, r(t) = argmax, G*(t, r; a), and, solving simultaneously, we obtain the Nash pair (tN, rN). Denote home government's utility under the Nash as N(a, a) = G (tN(a, a), rN(a, a) The Ruling. Instead consider the following DS game structure. After the domestic country has adopted a defect action (a violation) in any period, the other country (the complainant) files a dispute (requests a panel) with the WTO. Then the panel hears the case and makes a decision. If it finds a violation, it also decides on a penalty; finally the defendant decides whether to pay the penalty or not. The panel faces the same informational constraints as the other players. If the foreign country has played rc, no information can be gleaned about foreign's domesticpolitics; however, home has defected and played t = t (a), both foreign and the panel can invert the function describing the optimal defect tariff, and infer the state of politics at home, a. When a is known to all the players we will designate it i. Clearly, both players and the DSP identify that a defection has occurred, since all can see that tD(a) > r. But the WTO permits a country to rescind its commitments in various instances. For instance, the defendant might argue that it has become concerned that the good is not safe for human, plant, or animal health, or that its continued import may harm the environment (such as the debate over genetically modified foodstuffs between the United States and the European Union (EU), or hormone-fed beef). The DSP will have to make a determination as to whether the measure is "a disguised restriction on international trade" for political purposes or a legitimate health, safety, or environmental measure14. The probability that the DSP finds in favor of the plaintiff is set (as in Reinhardt 2001) at 0 e (0, 1), which is common knowledge. Should the panel find in favor of the plaintiff, the panel will attempt to measure the loss that the complainant has sustained due to the defect action of the other member. If home defects, foreign receives S*(a, a) instead of C*(a). Then the actual losses are L* (a, a) = C*(a) -S*(a, a) . However, the panel cannot verify (ex ante) the actual value a. Instead it must take its best guess given the information at its disposal. The actual estimate of the losses incurred by foreign will be the expected value of L*(, a), since i is known, which we write as L*(a) = f£ L*(i, a) d1. Similarly, if foreign is the defecting party, the panel will establish a compensation of L(&) = fa L(a, &) d4, which is the expected losses experienced by home. As far as the plaintiff country is concerned, the expected loss (before the ruling is made) for which it will be compensated is OL*(a) for foreign and OL ( 15 Note that the cost associated with "escape" here-the use of the DSP mechanism-is endogenous, and changes period by period. Moreover, the event that the cost is actually applied to the defendant is stochastic (it occurs with probability 0) and is the outcome of the dispute settlement process. This is a generalization of the study of escape clauses by Rosendorff and Milner (2001) , in which the cost of escape was exogenous to the repeated game, in which the escape cost is incurred with certainty if the state chooses the escape clause action in any period, and in which the WTO had no arbitration role and merely reported if the offending country has penalized itself by incurring some exogenous adjustment costs.
The critical value of ADS is the level of the cost such that, if the government plays the "cooperate" strategy (either C or 7)S) into the indefinite future, the expected (net) benefits from doing so are equal to the expected benefits of defecting once and exiting the system forever. It is intuitive, therefore, that if the costs of the dispute procedure and the gains from defection are large, the government will cease to cooperate entirely. The next proposition and its corollary establish the central results of this paper: agreements with a DSP are more stable than those without. We establish that the set of shocks that the agreement can withstand is greater when a DSP is present; i.e., f < a. The corollary establishes that it is exactly those countries who are not patient enough to sustain cooperation in the pure PD who will gain from incorporating a DSP into the agreement. The DSP effectively lowers the threshold value of the discount rate necessary to sustain a cooperative outcome.
Proposition 2. The DSP is more stable than the PD; i.e., the per-period probability of breakdown is smaller under the DSP than under the PD.
The set of shocks that can be withstood without the equilibrium breaking down under the DSP, (0, a), is 16 Downs and Rocke (1995) present a series of games of international cooperation in the face of uncertain domestic politics, not unrelated to the game presented here. They argue that less severe punishments are necessary than the grim trigger required here in order to facilitate cooperation or, alternatively, a probabilistic approach to punishment. Agreements must therefore incorporate a degree of "optimal imperfection" to be effective. Here we include the dispute settlement strategy in the action space and obtain long-run cooperation under the grim trigger, and without uncertainty about whether the punishment, once authorized, will be applied. Stable, (0, a) D (0, a) , the Set for Which the PD Game is Stable larger than (is a superset of) the set of shocks that can be withstood in the PD game, (0, a). The implication here is that the DSP game is more robust against political shocks than is the pure PD version. To prove this result, we superimpose Figures 1 and 2 As the diagram is drawn, it is easily observed that fa < t; interestingly, for the result to hold in general, we require 0 < min{ DS ADS}; i.e., there must be sufficient uncertainty about the decision of the DSP. The effect of this restriction is to require (weakly) that there is an upper bound on the costliness of making use of the DSP. In addition to limiting the loss to an estimate of the damages incurred, the loss is lower in expectation if there is some probability that the panel will not penalize the offending member state. 
FIGURE 3. The Set of Shocks for Which the DS Game is

The Trade-off between Rigidity and Stability
This extra stability of the DS game comes at a price, of course. Consider the interval (a, iZ) in Figure 3 . In the PD game, we would see pure cooperation; in the DS game for a shock in this interval, DS is played. The DS action is a defect action. There is no "true" cooperation in that period. Therefore the extra flexibility provided by the DS action (permitting cooperation when it was previously not possible) comes at the cost of its being used in periods when pure cooperation was previously available. Hence, an agreement with a DSP yields lower per-period cooperation (less rigid) but has a lower probability of breakdown (more stable).17
THE PRICE OF ESCAPE
A similar argument provides a rationale for the inclusion of escape clauses in the WTO agreements ( The agreement has over time made escape more accessible, or easier to achieve; as a consequence we have seen an increased use of these measures. Some scholars and a number of negotiators have argued that it is time to tighten up some of these practices-an attempt to reform the Antidumping practices was unsuccessful during the Uruguay Round. The question is effectively: How easy should it be for a state to obtain tolerated relief? The model provides a clear way to think about this: lower costs clearly mean more frequent, tolerated escape, and less per-period cooperation. But it also works to increase the stability of the agreement and may permit more countries to accede to the deal. Stricter rules mean more cooperation, but fewer members and a more unstable agreement.
Evidence
In 1996, the United States requested a DSP panel arguing that the EU's prohibition on the imports of beef treated with hormones was inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO. The panel found that the EU ban was unjustified on a number of grounds, and the decision was upheld by the appellate body. Arbitration resulted in agreement that 15 months would elapse by which time the ban was to be removed. The EU did not comply with the finding and failed to remove the offending measure within that time period. The panel authorized retaliation/compensation of $116.8 million (and C$11.3 million in a similar case filed by the Canadians). The EU has not complied, and the United States continues to suspend concessions. Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001) remark that the EU was politically unable to comply with the ruling: "Political constraints reflecting a strong lobby in the EU that opposed the use of hormones in meat production made it (compliance) impossible" (84). In addition, any increase in the productivity of European beef farmers would actually increase the costs of the common agricultural policy, something the EU could ill afford.
Other cases fit this pattern-a panel ruling to cease the offending measure, with which the defendant fails 20 Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) describe these exceptions as "safety valves" (38), designed specifically to deal with political and social problems associated with increased imports. Sykes (1991) suggests that political gains to one party of exercising an escape clause must be larger than the losses that accrue to the trading partner for an escape clause to be "politically Pareto efficient." Notice we make no such demand here-rather the payment of the penalty acts as a signaling device of the intention of the rogue state to return to the fold of cooperating nations.
Notice that RM, Sykes (1991) , and this paper all require some penalty to be paid for demanding relief that is tolerated by the trading partners. In that sense, these opportunities for escape resemble the penalties a private contractor might incur if it chose to breach a contract. Such a promisor might find it preferable to renegotiate, or pay damages, once the time to perform arrives rather than perform under the terms of the contract. As to the durability of regimes with DSPs, we can look to the recent proliferation of regional and preferential trading arrangements, many of which have adopted dispute resolution mechanisms of various kinds. These mechanisms vary from "soft"-ad hoc negotiations among the parties to "hard"-standing independent tribunals whose determinations are legally binding. Smith (2000) , for instance, examines a set of 63 post-1957 Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) and explains variations in the degree of "legalism" or "bindingness" of the DSPs by the degree of economic asymmetry of the signatories, especially when interacted with the proposed depth of liberalization.
While the argument here has focused on the institutions of the WTO, a similar logic applies to any PTA with a DSP with the aforementioned characteristics. Using the richer universe of PTAs, we can consider two testable hypotheses emerging from the model:
1. Those PTAs with DSPs, especially those that embody the proportionality principle, will be more durable, or last longer, than those without such an institutional characteristic. 2. The number of signatories will be higher in those agreements that embody a DSP relative to those that do not. N -A) ) or a < a. If a < a < a, then B(a) < OL(i) and the benefits of defection are too small to make either pure defection or use of the DSP mechanism worthwhile; if a < a < a, the benefits of the DSP outweigh pure cooperation, but it is still intertemporally optimal to voluntarily pay the proportionality penalty to benefit from the possibility of cooperation in the next period. The no-defect condition is violated when a > a; then the gains from pure defection, and the Nash reversion play from then on are preferred to cooperation. Hence, a pair of DSSs is an equilibrium. U
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